Beacon rollout, especially on a large scale, offers both technical and logistical challenges that can be difficult to foresee. One of the primary obstacles lies in ensuring that the test data collected is accurate, reliable, and not impacted by the beacons in transit that haven’t yet been installed. Allied to this, security concerns with certain beacons arise due to the ease of manually switching some models on and off, which can lead to potential tampering after deployment.
When dealing with numerous beacons in a rollout, one of the foremost issues encountered is the collection of erroneous data from beacons that haven’t been installed yet. As these uninstalled beacons are often carried around during deployment, they can inadvertently be picked up by the network, which results in inaccurate data being associated with incorrect locations. This misleading data can create confusion and additional workload, as it requires careful analysis to separate genuine location data from the erroneous data generated by beacons that are simply in transit.
Some beacon models come with manual switches that are intended to make them easier to manage. While this can be convenient for setup, these accessible switches can also pose a security risk. If someone with malicious intent gains access to the beacons, they may tamper with them, switching them off to disrupt communication or even switching them on in the wrong location. This can undermine the reliability of the data collected and even create security vulnerabilities in the beacon network.
One effective solution we discovered through trial and error is the use beacons without manual switches and large Faraday bags to manage uninstalled beacons. Faraday bags block electromagnetic signals and prevent the beacons from inadvertently transmitting data before they’re installed. By placing beacons inside these bags, we avoid unnecessary data collection and maintain greater control over when and where each beacon starts transmitting.
